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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1962
THE SOCIAL PARADOX OF ZONING AND LAND
CONTROLS IN AN EXPANDING URBAN ECONOMY
By GEORGE L. CREAMER*
The essential condition of modern life is the city; its heartbeat,
the machine; its ultimate characteristic, the population, a vast and
interacting reservoir of labor and absorber of product. The popula-
tion movement toward Megalopolis is tidal. The desiderate of con-
temporary life cluster there; the once vital function of rural Amer-
ica is readily performable by constantly smaller population seg-
ments; and the economic function of the market town, archetype
of American living only forty years ago, is disappearing. A basic
trend since mid-eighteenth century, such is the thrust and develop-
mental speed of this movement that the United States consists, in
posse, and in twenty years will be in esse, thirty megapolitan cen-
ters, each vastly emanating from a core city, aggregately encom-
passing some 90% of the nation's people.
Presupposing such development, obviously the most valued
asset in such a civilization is megalopolitan land. Economic power
is largely involved in control, use, and dominance of that land.
Human comfort and well-being are intimately dependent upon the
uses made of that land. Of necessity, most human aspirations and
interests in some manner center upon it, and the control and use
of that asset or commodity becomes focal, the center on which bear
the most vital of economico-political forces.
Mr. Jus'ice Brewer once remarked: "The city is a miniature state,
the council is its legislature, the charter is its constitution."1 Justice
Lurton referred to the city as "presumptively the more populous
and better organized community."2 As megalopolitan life develops,
each miniature state strives for preeminence with the state itself,
with zoning the modal base and field of contest.
"Chalcedon was called the city of the blind, because its founders
rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet. The need
for vision of the future in the governance of cities has not lessened
with the years. The dweller within the gates, even more than the
stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness. '3 Thus, even the
most conservative of lawyers and jurists have recognized, putting
the thesis beyond the area of fruitful argument, the basic necessity
for some land use control. "Until recent years, urban life was com-
paratively simple; but with the great increase and concentration of
population, problems have developed, and continually are develop-
ing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restric-
tions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban
communities."4 Indeed, "regulations, the wisdom, necessity and
validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent
that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half
* F.,rtner in the Denver firm, Creamer & Creamer.
I Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893).
2 Chicago v. Surges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911).
3 Hesse v. Rath, 249 N.Y. 436, 438 (1928).
4 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-7 (1926).
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a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. "5
Only against a backgroundof this kind of general acceptance
of necessity for some land and use controls can we present zoning
problems as they have developed and are present among us. This
article has little utility as a technical legal exposition and is not
proposed as a manual of zoning practice or procedure; technical
matters are covered multipally by texts more complex than useful,
and a plethora of not necessarily reconcilable cases increases daily
at all judicial levels. Rather, it is hoped here to demonstrate the
multiple purposiveness of zoning, its complexity as a theater of
interaction of vital and diverse interests tending in common with
many of our institutions toward the schizophrenic; an area sun-
dered by forces divergently moving and like that fabled messenger,
mounting, to ride rapidly off in all directions.
DICTA usefully allows presentation of these problems because it
is a Colorado publication and because Denver is a megalopolis in
its essentials,-a juvenile megalopolis with those essentials suffi-
ciently at the surface to present symptoms for ready analysis. Me-
galopolitan growth is a phenomenon of such recency here as to
present a most valuable clinical exhibit.
Zoning as a concept finds its sole justification in the exercise
of the police power, allowable only as it tends to promote public
health, safety, and welfare. As restrictions upon the use of private
property, zoning regulations must be strictly construed. Use of
property for lawful purposes in the discretion of its owner is a
primary constitutional right; restriction is permissible but inhibited,
and allowable only as dictated by the public interest under proper
procedural safeguards. Restriction is not permissible for private or
individual ends, nor in the interest of competing property values.
Neither is restriction allowable on grounds of political utility or
for political convenience.
From these few premises, with which most will probably agree,
germinates and grows the schizophrenic seed. Zoning at base is
"policy." "New policies are usually tentative in their beginnings,
advance in firmness as they advance in acceptance .... Time may
be necessary to fashion them to precedent customs and conditions."6
Advance and pace usually, however, are neither undirectional nor
unswerving. If there be uniformity at all, it is the uniformity of a
spiral, reversing as it ascends or advances, a tendency causing the
appearance, when viewed from a static point of vantage, of move-
ment in directions quite opposite from the utlimate end. Policy is
politics, in essence, a variable quantity; "The alternations of our
national mood are such that a cycle of liberal government seldom
exceeds eight years."7 Nor does any other angulation of the spiral
continue without reverse much longer.
Recent Colorado zoning history demonstrates an apparent con-
tradiction in direction and conflict in purpose, characteristics often
besetting the path of precedent-based law. Forty years of zoning
in this state, however, rather clearly indicate the basic direction
5 Id. at 387.
6 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917).
7 Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremnacy 187 (1941).
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in which the spiral must proceed, as well as demonstrating the
barriers, interferences, and obstructions latent in that course.
Theoretically, the basis of zoning laws upon the police power
alerts the public immediately to the dangers implicit within the
concept. "The police power.., is the most absolute of the sovereign
powers of the state .... It 'extends to so dealing with the conditions
which exist in a state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of its people.' " "In a sense, the police power is but another name
for the power of government."9 According to Holmes, "police pow-
er" is used in a broad sense "to cover . . . and . . . to apologize for
the general power of the legislature to make a part of the commu-
nity uncomfortable by a change." 10
Zoning basically is the instrumentality by which the base pow-
er of the state, through the mechanism of the city, is focused upon;
the use of private property, the Arcanum under traditional Anglo-
American legal concepts. "The legal conception of property is of
rights;"'1 a conception of use and enjoyment; "whatever a person
can possess and enjoy by right."'12 Thus, "all that is beneficial in
property arises from its use, and fruits of that use."'1 3 So conceived,
zoning involves a fearful kind of power which must always be held
in balance.
"Property like every other social institution has a social func-
tion to fulfill;"'1 4 few will gainsay the hypothesis that "the property
rights to the individual we are to respect, yet we are not to press
them to the point at which they threaten the welfare of the secu-
rity of the many."'15
In the working out of regulation, its direction and modality,
calculation of the forces which actuate it cause the difficulty, the
paradox of zoning in an expanding economy. Succinctly stated by
McKenna: "Depart from the simple requirements of law, that
everyone must use his property so as not to injure others, and you
pass to refinements and confusing considerations."' 6
Constitutional literature is largely devoted to a search for a
basis for protection of property, or a justification for its limitation.
That quest epitomizes zoning. Story postulated that "it must always
be a question of the highest moment, how the property-holding
part of the community may be sustained against the inroads of
poverty and vice.' 7 That thesis is basic to constitutional law viewed
as a system of "constitutional limitations" since the Constitution
in large measure is essentially a restriction upon the rapacity of
majorities which, absent such legal barriers, could subject all things
to their desires by force of number alone. In our society, under the
Constitution, differential notions of utility may not be a basis to
deprive one of his property: "One does not lose what is one's own
S Louisville & N.R.R. v. Central Stock Yard Co., 212 U.S. 132, 150 (1909).
'Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell. 222 U.S. 225. 233 (1911).
1 0 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927).
11 LeRoy Fiber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 350 (1914).
12 Central Poc. R.R. v. Gallatin, 9 Otto (99 U.S.) 700, 738 (1878).
13 Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto (94 U.S.) 113, 141 (1876).
14 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
141 (Hall ed. 1947).
15 Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, in Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cordozo 254
(Hall ed. 1947).
16 LeRoy Fiber Co. v. Chicago M. & St. Paul Ry., supro note 11 at 350.
17 Story, Miscellaneous Writings 514 (1835).
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because its utility would be greater if it were awarded to someone
else."' 8
Neither, however, is the property owner wholly free to ignore
basic concepts of utility: "The realization of the benefits of property
must always depend in large degree on the ability and sagacity of
those who employ it."'19 To maximize the value of property, its pri-
vate owner must be able to "divine in advance the equilibrium of
social desires.
20
Zoning of Megalopolis treats of the most restricted of commo-
dities, land, possessed of a unique place and valued because of its
unique location in one of the 30-odd foci of American civilization.
Terrible paradoxes result.
Substantial segments of the community seek to restrict the use
of land controlled by other substantial segments who desire to make
use of their properties in a lawful and beneficial manner. These
purposes may, however, make less comfortable living conditions
for others when practiced in a comparatively restricted space. Such
desired restrictions involve one of the most legitimate ends of zon-
ing, but severe abuses and extreme emotional pressures are inher-
ent in them.
Competing users of land, for like and similar purposes, seek to
impose restrictions upon their competitors through zoning laws
legal in form, but tending to the personal benefit and aggrandize-
ment of the movant competitors only. This illustrates an entirely
illegitimate subversion of zoning ends and a practice universally
present in all theaters of zoning operations.
Further, a tendency develops to aggregate in the hands of the
more legislatively favored segment of megalopolitan society the
most esteemed and valued land assets of the society, creating by
virtue of legislative restriction of use a monopoly of a priceless
commodity in the hands of that favored group. This is one of the
most insidious of zoning practices, a perpetually crescent threat
implicit in zoning as it is now practiced.
Finally, there tends to develop, quite apart from the basic con-
cept of "police power" and legitimate protective ends, a substitution
of public officials' notions of land utility value for like notions of
private owners. That is to say, there is a crescent tendency to at-
tempt centralization, through zoning, of control of the economic
18 Golde Clothes Shop, Inc. v. Loena's Buffalo Theaters, Inc., 236 N.Y. 465, 470 (1923).
19 Simpson c. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 458 (1913).
20 Holmes, Speeches 100 (1934).
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activity of the state, represented by the use values of land in Mega-
lopolis, in the hands of a bureaucratic minority which is by no
means necessarily capable of wielding that power. Such bureau-
cratic subjugation at best tends to strangle and distort economic
development in an expanding economy; at worst, it threatens ex-
tinction of that economy in the form in which we know it. This is
the most insidious danger in zoning.
Rights of property are inseparable from rights of personalty,
the basis of our constitutional structure. Property merely represents
the dominance of individual man over his physical environment.
Maximization of Man, as exemplified in the completed individual,
must remain the basic end of a free society. Agglomerative prin-
ciple, destructive of individual man, must begin his ruin by destroy-
ing his control over property.
Local zoning history usefully illustrates the collision of forces
derivative from the sometimes conflicting, but accepted principles
mentioned above, and illuminates the paradoxes. Danger imminent
in any situation, if made explicit, perhaps may be rectified or
avoided.
The growth pattern of Denver was established basically long
prior to the legal concept of zoning. The city is located at the con-
fluence of the Cherry Creek and Platte River, on an alluvial plain
extending easterly and southerly, deposited by those streams and
their predecessors between highlands which are prehistoric river
banks. Early development centered on streets roughly paralleling
the River, principally on Larimer Street, and basically in a south-
erly-northerly direction.
Historically population movement was south and east. The estab-
lishment of the Capitol Building on the east highlands, and palatial
housing developments in the surrounding areas during the gold and
silver booms of the '80's, caused a turning of business development
at a 900 angle, and its movement toward the east-centered residence
areas, particularly along Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth
Streets, and at right angles to the former business centers, up to
Broadway, a north-south thoroughfare faced by the new Capitol
Building.
Early Denver became dependent on a central transportation
system, based on rails, focusing traffic from residential areas into
a business center extending approximately from Broadway on its
east to the old business sections near the river. Development con-
tinued from the north-south artery, Broadway, and its intersection
with the east-west artery, Colfax Avenue, at which focus stands
the Capitol.
Until the mid-Twenties of this century, no Denver zoning con-
trols existed, and few building restrictions of any kind were in
effect. In May, 1923, Denver enacted Section 219A of its Charter,
a zoning-enabling act, almost verbatim to that recommended b"
the Department of Commerce, which act became in almost identical
language a state statute, permitting zoning by towns and cities in
addition to the City and County of Denver."
1
Ordinance 14, Series of 1925, was a zoning ordinance, adhering
to a plan which recognized then existing patterns, including the
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. §60-1 et seq. (1953).
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limited central business district, several classes of business and
commercial districts almost identical as to uses by right and only
slightly more restricted in building dimensions and bulk than the
central area, and extending along principal thoroughfares, certain
industrial districts, and the familiar complex of single family, dou-
ble-family, and multiple-family dwelling areas.
. The basic validity of that ordinance was early considered in
Colby v. Board of Adjustment,22 which held that zoning ordinances
act not only negatively but affirmatively for the public welfare,
and basically upheld the concept of zoning, warning specifically,
however, that general validation of the principle did not mean the
court would hesitate to invalidate, on constitutional grounds, parti-
cular applications of zoning as adopted.
Much earlier, the Colorado court had laid down basic tenets
as to the right to use land, from which it had seldom departed,
even when sanctioning zoning regulation. More importantly, the
court had held firmly within judicial control all exercise of these
restrictive powers. In City and County of Denver v. Rogers, involv-
ing prohibition by Denver, as a nuisance, of any brick yard inside
the City and within 1200 feet of any residence, school, or park, the
court proclaimed reasonableness the key to regulation, a concept
always to be determined by judicial standards: "The general grant
of authority to the city not being, as we have shown, sufficiently
specific and definite to warrant such broad and unrestricted legis-
lation as is contained in this ordinance, its reasonableness, as well
as the question of its constitutionality, become proper matters for
consideration. '23 The ordinance was voided as "manifestly radical,
unjust and oppressive" and as tending to destroy property without
due process.
When the Denver City Council, prior to formal zoning ordi-
nances, refused to permit a home for Negro aged and orphans, our
court, in City and County of Denver v. United Negroes Protective
Association, held that such Councils "are not beyond the control
of the courts when, as here, by the findings of the trial court, they
have grossly abused that discretion or acted arbitrarily.
' 24
Though the City had hailed Colby v. Board2i- as a charter grant-
ing the municipality limitless power to restrict, it became apparent
in Hedgcock v. People, that such boundless discretion was not in-
tended. The action involved desired business use of property abut-
ting on a street zoned as residential, which growth of the City
had made arterial and business in nature. Residential use of
the property restricted the land to $350.00 value, while business
use permitted realization of some $3,500.00. The court held that a
zoning declaration, contrary to the actuality of principal use, was
void: "The clear inference from their testimony is that prior to the
adoption of the zoning ordinance the block referred to was a busi-
ness center and was continued so, and that it ought never to have
been zoned otherwise. '26 Accordingly, rezoning was a denial of use
of the property, unconstitutional and invalid legislation, "because
22 81 Colo. 344, 255 Poc. 443 (1927).
23 46 Colo. 479, 104 Pac. 1042, 25 LRA (NS) 247 (1909).
24 76 Colo. 86, 230 Poc. 598 (1924).
25 Supra note 22.
26 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
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the zoning in question was unreasonable and therefore unconstitu-
tional in that it unnecessarily and arbitrarily limited the use of
a certain parcel of property for a purpose that was not justified
under the admitted and determined facts and circumstances. '27
Arbitrary regulation in defiance of existing economic facts, is
prohibited, as is the continuation of restrictions under circum-
stances in which economic change has made the restrictions inap-
plicable. People ex rel. Friedman v. Weber, involving the introduc-
tion of business on Colorado Boulevard, an arterial street once
residential, and wholly changed in character by developing use,
states: "It is scarcely disputed that Tract A is practically valueless
for residential purposes but of very considerable value for com-
mercial use and this conclusion is inescapable from the admitted
facts regardless of expert testimony .... Our conclusion is that the
zoning of Tract A is contrary to the Charter amendment, confisca-
tory, and void." 2
8
Moreover, restrictions must be interpreted in such manner as
to allow projected use, rather than prohibit it. In People ex rel.
Grommon v. Hedgcock, a building permit was refused a bungalow
court in a business district upon the claim that a special section of
the then zoning ordinance required special permission for construc-
tion of "automobile tourist camps." That phenomenon was not de-
fined in the ordinance, and the court declined permission to limit
use of the land:
Until the legislative agency defines and prohibits such
camps, there is, in our opinion, no legal basis-the alleged
basis being too doubtful-under which one may be de-
prived of a legitimate use of property without violating
constitutional guarantees in that respect. The police power,
which is the legal basis for zoning legislation, must con-
stantly be reconciled with the legitimate use of private
property, in harmony with such guaranties.29
Despite such declarations, Denver continued to assert, in es-
sence, that the right to use land derived from legislative authority,
refusing to recognize that restriction upon use is abnormal, requir-
ing demonstration of right and necessity. That theory was suc-
cinctly and unequivocally rejected in Jones v. Board of Adjust-
ment:
30
We consider briefly some basic fundamentals. The right
to the use and enjoyment of property for lawful purposes
is the very essence of the incentive to property ownership
The right to thus use property is a property right fully
protected by the due process clause of the Federal and
State constitutions The use to which an owner may put his
property is subject to a proper exercise of the police power.
The so-called police power is the authority under which
zoning ordinances have been universally upheld. In every
ordered society the state must act as umpire to the extent
of preventing one man from so using his property as to pre-
vent others from making a corresponding full and free use
27 Id. at 528.
28 110 Colo. 161, 132 P.2d 183 (1942).
29 106 Colo. 300, 104 P.2d 607 (1940).
30 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
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of their property. Thus, under the police power, zoning
ordinances are upheld imposing limitations upon the use
of land, provided, however, that the regulations are rea-
sonable and provided, further, that their restrictions in
fact have substantial relation to the public health, safety,
or general welfare.31
The basic problem involved definitions, specifically the word "of-
fice." It was held that interpretation of the ordinance required a
meaning favorable to the unrestricted use of property.
It is judicially recognized that as economic growth takes place
within a community, restrictions once utile and significant become












inapplicable, and change of use, as from residential to commercial,
must be permitted. Bohn v. Board of Adjustment of Denver recog-
nizes that "It is a fundamental principle recognized by all the au-
thorities that any regulation or restriction upon that use of prop-
erty which bears no relation to public safety, health, morals or
general welfare, cannot be sustained as a proper exercise of the
police power of the municipality. 3 2 Zoning must change as the
character of a neighborhood changes, since status too much pro-
longed can lead to decay:
Now that West Colfax Avenue has become a cross-country
artery and, as determined by the Board, is lined with busi-
ness and commercial uses, the character of this territory,
where Relator desires to build, has changed with the pass-
age of time, the action of the Board, and the tacit assent
of adjacent property owners. What at one time may have
been considered residential property now has been de-
voted to business and commercial uses. It is very apparent
from this record that the action of the Board in the instant
case was arbitrary and capricious and will not stand the
test set forth in Hedgcock v. People ex rel .... 33
At the end of World War II, the Denver area greatly increased
in population and general economic activity. Pent-up demand
caused development of vast housing areas outside the bound of
previous urbanization. In parallel with most metropolitan centers,
there occurred a shift from a centralized city, dependent on mass
transport to a central business district, to widely dispersed living,
under semi-suburban conditions, made possible by diffuse auto-
motive transport.
In Megalopolis, the "core city" must diminish in relative eco-
nomic importance. In Denver that happened. Historic population
movement south and east was accelerated over the plains by reason
of building convenience and ease of utilities installation. Popula-
tion moved so rapidly and so far south and east that the epi-center
of the metropolitan area no longer occurred in the "Down Town"
central business district centering at Colfax and Broadway, but lay
three miles east and two and one-half miles south, near the inter-
section of Colorado Boulevard with Cherry Creek.
Highways were now the important links, not railway lines.
However, though the "Down Town" area was no longer central in
economic fact, it remained so in politico-economic influence. The
concept of a centralized business district, based on heavy foot traf-
fic and moved by street railway into the central area, was no longer
valid. Strong impetus existed for the development for commercial
purposes of the "shopping center," -the dispersed commercial area,
varying in size from the purely local store cluster centering in a
housing development to the "regional shopping center" aggregating
scores of stores and serving vast population segments.
Intense economic rivalry developed between interests primarily
centered upon outlying and rapidly developing regions, and those
centered in the established, but relatively static central area. Corn-
:12 129 Colo. 539, 271 P.2d 1051 (1954).
3:3 Id. at 544.
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mercial and industrial activities followed retail trade toward de-
centralization, as new techniques made necessary vastly increased
single-floor areas for warehousing of goods, rendering obsolete en-
tire sections of warehouse facilities downtown; as manufacturing
occupied new and enormous sites on the periphery of the city; and
as subsidiary processing followed major facilities to the city's edge.
By Ordinance 16, Series of 1955, the City embarked on danger-
ous zoning expedients. Developed for thirty-one years on the 1925
pattern, recognizing the structural economics of the city as of its
adoption, Denver had followed some uniform pattern of growth.
The 1955 ordinance essayed a kind of zoning revolution, arbitrarily
and radically reducing the amount of land available for non-resi-
dential purposes, placing capricious restrictions upon lands per-
mitted business and commercial use outside the central business
district, and imposing ruthless restrictions upon the size and bulk
of buildings outside the central area. Regulation was atempted
in the sole interest of the Central Business District, attempting to
render competing activities subservient by providing for vast land
requirements for "off street parking," sometimes equivalent to four
time utilizable area, but not required at all in the Central Business
District.
Peripheral business districts were recognized as to use, but
specifically declared to be servient areas, tributary to the Central
District, restricted as to parking requirements, building bulk, and
the like in order to render competition with the Central Business
Distiict impotdnt.
Most immediately the impact of the ordinance was felt by the
Broadway aiea, adjacent to the Central Business District, an area
severely affected by the newly established differentiation and by
provisions purporting to declare improper many traditional and
established uses in the area, seeking to root them out by a system
of proclaimed non-conformity and required registration of use.
The result was the first of the so-called Denver Buick cases, insti-
tuted as No. B-8071 in the Denver District Court, in which, upon
procedural due process grounds, the 1955 ordinance was wholly
voided. The supreme court affirmed that voidance.
34
Dramatically paralleling the court actions to void the ordinance,
the Denver Council engaged in passage, under different notice
forms and more careful adherence to charter procedures, the iden-
tical ordinance the court was voiding. As the court sat upon the
1955 ordinance there was introduced Councilman's Bill 403, Series
of 1956, enacted on November 5, 1956, as Ordinance 392, Series of
1956.
Immediate court action followed in the Denver District Court-35
assailing the re-passed ordinance on varied procedural and sub-
stantive grounds. The ordinance was invalidated upon the finding
that it ignored substantially all economic reality and was violently
discriminatory.
Seldom has legislation been so clearly motivated by the desire
of an entrenched economic interest and its supporters to thwart
34 136 Colo. 482, 319 P.2d 490 (1957).




economic competition by preventing land uses by others. It is indeed
a curious phenomenon of modern economics, in land use and other-
wise, that the course of those most violently opposed to private
rights in property and the course of the most vociferous advocates
of laissez-faire run directly parallel. The land monopolist buttresses
his depredations with cries of "economic freedom," while those who
advocate unrestricted public control tend to support that course,
since aggregation in limited hands, monopoly and oligopoly, make
eventually easier the task of monopoly in the state or total con-
fiscation of that property. The more limitedly property is held in
control, the more readily that control will pass from private hands
into the state. Modern zoning, thus subject to abuse, leads unques-
tionably to the monopoly state, and if protracted must lead to total
public control of the megalopolitan land resource.
Curiously, no one appeared, as shown by council and court
records, to support the zoning measure in council. Substantial ob-
jections were made, but the measure unanimously passed, even
though the courts were voiding its earlier version, and despite the
monitions available in extensive precedent litigation.
After a trial of weeks' duration, the District Court rendered
an extensive written opinion. It discussed attempted differentiation
between the Central Business District and the peripheral, Broad-
way-centered, business district, referred to in the ordinance as the
B-6 District: "[T] his so-called description of the Business 6 District
so far as it relates to the district itself and the purpose it serves is
totally in error and without foundation of fact. '36 The court pointed
out that "both business districts contain businesses and buildings
devoted to the same use of right and business as the other. '37 The
ordinance, motivated by desire to protect economic interests in the
Central Business District, attempted to render the peripheral dis-
trict subservient, declaring "this district, at present, is a large area
located immediately adjacent to the B-5 District [Central Business
District] for which it acts as a service area, . . ."3 Of this assertion,
the trial court said: "This is totally without any foundation in
fact.
39
The court held that differential parking requirements made
imperative devotion of private property to public service and pur-
pose without compensation, in all districts except the favored Cen-
tral Business District. Those requirements were therefore stricken in
totality, the court finding that the regulation "divides the require-
ments into a maze of rules and laws which, in reality, make the
owners of the real property therein the pawns and victims of the
Department of Zoning Administration, with oppressive require-
ments, as the court will point out.
40
This ordinance, designed to advance private interests, was con-
demned in language perhaps as strong as any ever judicially used
in Colorado:
The ordinance as to the description and motive for the
zoning and off-street parking regulations is the most un-
36 Id. at 17.
37 Id. at 18.
38 Id. at 19.
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 20.
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realistic document ever enacted by a law-making body, as
relates to the B-5 and B-6 Districts. And thereby a segment
of the business property in the City and County of Denver is
strangled with a phony description of the district which
could never have been written nor authorized by a person
living in Denver, let alone by any member of the City
Council who can or might look out of the Council Cham-
ber windows.
41
Attempted discrimination was total: strangulation by mis-
definition; attempted imposition of subservient status; differential
parking treatment of areas directly and prospectively competitive;
and finally an attempt to require registration of land use, ultimately
to exclude as non-conforming thousands of individual uses, re-
troactively to the date of the voided Ordinance 16, Series of 1955.
Those attempts at regimentation and retroactivity the court also
voided, it being held that "the power to prohibit lawful enterprise,
and the use of one's property was never the intent of the people in
adopting the zoning amendment to the Charter, nor will it permit
uncontrolled regulations and dictatorial powers of commercial and
industrial enterprise, such as set forth .. .-42 in the registration
and non-conforming use sections of the enactment.
The supreme court affirmed that opinion, and extensively
quoted from it in the second Denver Buick case.43 District differen-
tials were entirely put down; off-street parking provisions were
wholly voided; and the court found that under applicable Charter
provisions, the Council could not require landowners who had
theretofore used property for permitted purposes to register the
same as non-conforming, to submit reports thereon, to encumber
their titles, or to run the risk of loss of right to the use of their
properties. Extension of uses, change in rental patterns, and repair,
extension, and alteration of structure could not be prohibited. The
court later adhered to its opinion in Denver v. Redding-Miller, Inc.
44
The Denver Buick cases illustrate two of the most violent of the
paradoxes of modern zoning. First, zoning is susceptible of terrible
politico-economic destortion, the result of conscious effort, as spe-
cifically held in the cases, to favor one segment of the community
over another and to vest in that favored segment the power potent
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 33
43 City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959).
44 141 Colo. 269, 347 P.2d 954 (1959).
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in monopolies, control over business-commercial land uses in Mega-
lopolis. Second, the cases demonstrate the danger of legislation,
fostered by bureaucracy in the city, the little state, which "divides
the requirements into a maze of rules and laws which, in reality,
make the owner of real property therein the pawns and victims of"
the administrative bodies involved. These abuses never end, but
have found protraction even in privately and bureaucratically in-
spired attempts directly to legislate against judicially determined
fact.
It is constitutionally clear in Colorado that no one holds or uses
his property at the sufferance of his neighbor and that legislation
tending to restrict use of property solely for the advantage of a
neighbor or competitor is void.
These principles were early set forth in Curran v. Denver,
voiding an ordinance which made use of one person's property
dependent upon consent of his neighbor, because "it commits, in
some instances, the exercise of the municipality's legislative discre-
tion to property owners and residents, and in others, entrusts such
power to the caprice of certain of its officers, and vests in them
an absolute or despotic power to grant, refuse or revoke the right
to carry on an ordinary, legitimate business.
45
The Curran case was followed by Willison v. Cooke, in which it
was held that:
[I] t is a fundamental law, that a municipality under our
system of government may, by ordinance, require the owner
of a lot to so use it that the public health and safety will
be best conserved, and to this end its police power may be
exercised; but it is also fundamental, that such owner has
the right to erect such buildings covering such portions
thereof as he chooses, and put his property, as thus im-
proved, to any legitimate use which suits his pleasure,
provided that in so doing he does not imperil or threaten
harm to others.
46
In that same Willison case it is further said:
Legislative restrictions upon the use of property can only
be imposed upon the assumption that they are necessary
for the health, comfort or general welfare of the public;
and any law abridging rights to use of property which does
not infringe the right of others, or which limits the use
of property beyond what is necessary to provide for the
welfare and general security of the public cannot be in-
cluded in the police power of a municipal government.
4 7
Fortunately, rights of property owners are not fundamentally
subject to the legislative body, but are specifically a matter 'for the
courts:
Police regulations, in order to be valid, must tend to ac-
complish a legitimate public purpose; that is, such regula-
tions must have a substantial relation to the public objects
which government may legally accomplish; and while it is
for the legislative department of a municipality to deter-
45 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
46 54 Colo. 320, 326, 130 Pac. 828 (1913).
47 Id. at 326-27.
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mine the occasion for the exercise of its police power, it is
clearly within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine the
reasonableness of that exercise, when, as in the case at bar,
it assumes that power by virtue of its incidental or a general
grant of authority.
48
Accordingly, the consent of adjacent property owners to the
construction of a store building was unnecessary:
These regulations do not, in the slightest degree, have any
relation whatever to the health, safety, or general welfare
of the public, nor do they tend, in any sense, to accomplish
anything for the benefit of the public in this respect, but
merely attempt to limit the petitioner in a use of his prop-
erty, which does not infringe upon the rights of others.
This deprives him of the fundamental right to erect a store
building upon his lots covering such portions thereof as he
chooses, although, by so doing, he does not imperil or
threaten injury to others of which they can lawfully com-
plain. 49
The Curran and Willison cases, old though they are, and ante-
cedent to zoning though they may be, find specific approval of the
court in the recent Denver Buick decisions.
That court, moreover, has made crystal clear its disapproval of
the attempts of economic competitors to limit by zoning the uses of
land. Westwood Meat Markets, Inc. v. McLucas °5 0 involving an in-
junction by a competing market sought against zoning allowing con-
struction of shopping center facilities, stated that zoning can be
justfied only as a proper exercise of the police power, and that
owners and lessees of commercial property distant from the subject
property and of the same type as zoning authorized upon the
subject, were not, as competitors, "aggrieved persons" entitled to
attack or question zoning. Nothing, indeed, is more pernicious than
the notion that a competitor may frustrate, by frustrating zoning,
he development of economic competition.
Modern zoning is pregnant with and implicitly contains mo-
nopoly. So-called governmental "planning" accepts as a basic hypo-
thesis that commercial and business land must exist in large, dense
aggregates, and in limited locations. That planning accepts as an
article of faith the concentrated "shopping center," the "industrial
park," and the particular concentration of all retail, commercial, and
business activity within ever narrower bounds. Such centers are, as
land investments, in point of building capital required to institute
and operate them, complex economic enterprises.
Small, local, and independent retail merchants cannot hope to
possess their own land or building resources, for zoning limits avail-
able lands, and drives toward tenant status the local proprietor.
The "center," however, rejects that tendency because, by reason of
the vast sums necessarily invested in it, it is itself dependent for
financing upon exterior means, institutional sources interested in
"quality of tenancy," the certainty of rent collection. It is hypothe-
48 Id. at 327-28.
49 Id. at 328-29.
50 146 Colo. 435, 361 P.2d 776 (1961).
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sized that any national operation, any substantial commercial chain,
any potential or actual monopoly or oligopoly, is preferable in
essence as a commercial risk to any individual or local merchant.
Prime space in prime and scarce commercial land facilities, then,
must be given to non-local operations, tending to the monopoliza-
tion of commercial and economic activity generally in fewer and
ever fewer hands.
Justice Story said the "monopoly" as understood in law, "is an
exclusive right granted to a few of something which was before
of common right. '51 It follows necessarily that "the granting of mo-
nopolies, or exclusive privileges to individuals or corporations, is
an invasion of the right of others to choose a lawful calling, and
an infringement of personal liberty.
52
"Nor is it for the substantial interests of the country that any
one commodity should be within the sole power and subject to the
sole will of one powerful combination of capital," 53 for the simple
reason that, as observed by Justice Brandeis, "human nature is such
that monopolies, however well intentioned, and however well regu-
lated, inevitably become, in the course of time, oppressive, arbitrary,
unprogressive, and inefficient,"5 4 which is but another mode of
phrasing Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely.
Megalopolitan land is limited. Zoning limits still further the
highly productive part thereof, commercial and business land. Eco-
nomics of building finance restrict holdings of land and its use still
further. Zoning is thus potentially capable of terrible abuse, and
Denver has seen in the last six years that abuse in potent action.
Zoning in this community has been made the prime instrument in
advancement of selfish personal interests of a limited community
segment. Our courts have wisely thwarted that attempt. The at-
tempt, however, will continue unabated.
It is one of the paradoxes of zoning, also, that the emotional
overtones raised by the word in the public mind are such that the
residential landowner, interested in limiting incursions against his
own uses, forgets that all coins have a reverse, and that the restric-
tions for which he sometimes clamours may tend toward monopoly
and the eventual strangulation and death of Megalopolis itself. The
"Great City," the metropolitan area, can develop only if develop-
ment is reasonably free. If trammelled unduly, then surely the
community, like a body without circulation, will die. It is healthful,
therefore, that recent Colorado decisions limit the direct right of a
competitor to use zoning objections as a device to thwart and stifle
competition.
There is, however, and courts recognize, a rightful area within
which property owners may be heard to protest. This area involves
primarily protection of developed private residential property
against unwarranted commercial intrusion. Westwood Markets
5 5
specifically recognizes the right of residential property owners,
51 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
52 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872).
53 U.S. v. Trans-Missouri F. Association, 166 U.S. 290, 324 (1896).
54 Brandeis, A Free Man's Life 181 (1946).
55 Supra note 40.
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which is explored at considerable length by the court in Holly
Development, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners.5 6 The Colo-
rado court has indicated that it will protect established residential
districts against business incursion, commercial or other use, absent
the strongest showing of changed circumstances, which is essentially
as it should be.
Clark v.. City of Boulder5 7 points out that residential property
owners may rely on existing zoning conditions, where there has
been no material change in the character of the neighborhood re-
quiring re-zoning in the public interest. Specifically, the court
refused re-zoning of a service station site proximate to a residential
area. In such limited circumstances, property so proximate to a
residential zone, though more profitably usable for commercial than
residential purposes, may not be accorded special treatment by re-
zoning. In the circumstances of the case, the rule appears reasonable,
but it does constitute a repudiation of the basic constitutional
principle that change of condition such as to make property limited-
ly usable for the purpose originally zoned, and much more suitable
for another purpose, may compel re-zoning as an alternative to
confiscation.
Those who consider zoning a panacea for all ills look for radical
departures in each new zoning case. Colorado does not tend toward
radical departures in zoning. Zoning is a permitted area of legisla-
tion, the weaknesses, dangers and paradoxes implicit in which, our
court has clearly recognized, comprehended, and delineated. As in
other areas of law, zoning decisions are made upon the circum-
stances of a case. Trends and tendencies in this state remain clear,
and the court has been chary of approval of radical zoning changes
if the fact of excess has been made clear.
Clark v. Boulder demonstrates that the allowance of commercial
zoning in an area theretofore residential is based on the furtherance
of some comprehensive scheme or plan designed in accordance with
the public policy bases which underlie zoning. If so predicated, the
change is allowable, and if made simply to relieve a particular tract
from restriction, it is not permissible. Forwarding of a rational de-
sign is favored, but aggrandizement of an individual plot, to the
detriment of its surroundings, is improper. A rather similar rule is
announced in Frankel v. Denver."8
56 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032 (1959).
57 146 Colo. 526, 362 P.2d 160 (1961).
58 363 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1961).
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Baum v. Denver,59 like the Frankel case, holds that disparity in
values for one use as against another does not control in the deter-
mination of the validity of zoning ordinances. So stated, the princi-
ple may not be the ground for quarrel. The Baum case, however,
on its facts appears well outside the current of Colorado authority,
and in its fact setting probably represents a situation ideally illus-
trative of one of the paradoxes we here study.
That case involves the re-zoning of a substantial tract of land,
fronting on Sheridan Boulevard, an arterial highway which is also
the county lines separating Denver and Jefferson Counties. Denver
attempted residential zoning on segments of land along the thor-
oughfare; Jefferson County zoning is primarily business and com-
mercial, abutting across the street. Traffic is very high, the Boule-
vard being one of the half dozen most travelled streets in Megal-
opolis.
The automobile is a great maker of zoning and the prime
former of land values in Megalopolis. Where automobiles travel,
commercial uses follow. Commercial value inheres in land primarily
because of the habit of persons to foregather there, or because of
the number of persons, capable of entry, who pass the particular
location. Exterior effects of the automobile and of much-travelled
streets are such as limit use of property on those streets for resi-
dence purposes.
Such a main travelled street, given proper multi-directional
approaches and debouchements, will become in time commercial
or business in nature, once any business incursion is allowed. This
is manifest in Denver. Though zoning restrictions were imposed to
prevent it, East Colfax Avenue, West Colfax Avenue, and Colorado
Boulevard have successively become entirely commercial thorough-
fares, becoming so in a short period after entry of the first com-
mercial uses, and transformed from areas once almost wholly resi-
dential in character. City planners deplore those developments.
Finding catch-all phrases useful, they stigmatize the development as
"strip zoning." They stigmatize, in essence, a development inevitable
in the automotive age, the commercialization of the heavily-
travelled area, the foregathering of business where the people are.
The solution of the planner is "development in depth," that is,
zoning of large tracts, at scattered intervals, for commercial pur-
poses, while attempting to maintain the arterial frontages for resi-
dential or multi-family uses.
"Development in depth" is a necessary prelude to land monopo-
ly, as discussed above, and the arterial frontage is inutile for hous-
ing in most cases.
If large tracts bound a highway, residential uses are possible.
Otherwise, retention of arterial strips, bounding main-travelled
roads, for single-family residence use is visionary. No one who can
remove himself from the influence of really concentrated automo-
tive traffic, will voluntarily remain in residence proximate to it,
unless in tracts of such size as to permit effective depth screening.
The almost universally posited suggestion of the planner that mul-
itple dwellings replace the single-family unit foolishly ignores the
fact that the same objections which make the area noxious to an in-
59 363 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1961).
DICTA
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1962
dividual house-holder will be no more palatable to an apartment
dweller, particularly because only seldom does development make
possible siting on lots sufficiently deep to offset the traffic effect.
Resultantly, arterial streets open to business, usually by court
action, and once opened become commercial in time. Colorado Boule-
vard admirably demonstrates the point. In a procedurally intricate
litigation, called the Davidson Chevrolet cases,60 the Boulevard
was commercially opened, an inevitable result upon the failure of
Denver to eliminate the heavy commercial concentrations permitted
in the freely zoned Town of Glendale. Contrary to the desires of
the planners, and certainly in violent opposition to the wishes of
the central land monopolists, South Colorado Boulevard has de-
veloped, on a periphery, as the primarily growing commercial area
of Denver, inevitable because it is the geographic center of Mega-
lopolis, and one free from artificial zoning restraints.
Prolongation of severely restrictive zoning, indeed, may seri-
ously imperil all zoning in an area. If deterioration of a residential
area begins, residence in the area becomes undesirable. If the land
is not freed immediately for higher use, and made salable at reason-
able prices for that use, there is an open invitation sent forth to
urban blight. Immediate recognition of the problem, and limited
relaxation of zoning, as occurred in Denver on South Colorado
Boulevard and in parts of the Cherry Creek area, make possible
permanent retention of high-grade residence areas, screened and
protected by walls of high-grade commercial use fronting arterial
thoroughfares. Failure of timely relaxation, or total abdication of
control, cause those blight conditions manifest in the north part of
Colorado Boulevard, still rigidly controlled, and such blight spreads.
Urban blight is most effectively combatted by early zoning for
uses sufficiently productive in nature to permit destruction of
blightable improvements before the disease occurs or spreads. The
principle is simple. It is almost never recognized, and even less
often implemented-another zoning paradox.
Preservation of the residential community is the great strength
and the principal justification of zoning. The residential community
and the single residential proprietor, however, often essay more
than may be permissibly accomplished in the name of zoning. Such
excesses are not judicially allowed. Nelson v. Farr,61 a Greeley case,
is illustrative. Land was annexed to Greeley under a plat showing
blanket residential restrictions on lots in the annexed area. The
owner retained undeveloped tracts for business and commercial pur-
poses. The retained tract, when subsequently annexed to Greeley,
was zoned for commercial uses. A trial court, persuaded by the
residents to enjoin zoning, attempted to impose on the lands the
burdens of the restrictive covenants limiting previously annexed
lands to residential use. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the
limitation and held that a restrictive covenant could not extend by
judicial action to lands not covered by covenant or contract, that
there was no right to impose such a covenant not referential to
specific lands, by requiring zoning limitations parallel to the cove-
60 137 Colo. 575, 328 P.2d 377 (1958); 138 Colo. 171, 330 P.2d 1116 (1958).
61 143 Colo. 423, 354 P.2d 163 (1960).
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nant. The case appears proper on its facts, recognizing upon annexa-
tion that the land annexed was as free for development as prior to
annexation.
Annexation itself, however, presents severe zoning paradoxes.
Zoning power inheres both in County Commissioners, who often
exercise it county-wide, and have done so in Megalopolis, in the
Tri-Counties surrounding Denver, and a like power is granted muni-
cipal authorities, who have exercised that power within their cor-
porate limits. It is often sought to alter established County zoning,
and to alter established County plans, by annexing land to a muni-
cipality. Practically no change of circumstances is accomplished by
translation of municipal boundaries across a street, particularly in
Megalopolis, where city lines often afford no real differentiation
even in degree of urbanization, and annexation is most often only a
pretext for zoning, political and developmental gerrymanders.
These attempts to break established zoning by the juggling of
municipal boundaries are of common occurrence in Megalopolitan
areas. Colorado has not yet appellately decided the cases involving
such problems, though one such case has been much litigated and
determined at nisi prius.62 An attempt to alter county-imposed resi-
dential zoning, on property in a substantially developed residential
area, to permit commercial zoning by the annexing Ci t y of Engle-
wood, was, in that case, disallowed.
The Colorado court has been willing to protect established resi-
dential uses. It has not, however, been willing to allow militant use
of zoning by residents against other uses. The City of Englewood
by ordinance barred churches of all kinds from single and double
family residence areas, except as an act of grace, through its Board
of Adjustment. "[R] eligious and educational institutions," includ-
ing churches and places of worship, were permitted as "conditional
uses, provided the public interest is fully protected and ...uses




Land in a residen'ial district was given the Apostolic Christian
Church by a parishioner for the purpose of construction of a church
building. Plans were presented to the Board of Adjustment showing
conformance to building regulations and demonstrating adequate
parking. Numerous objections were filed by residents, protesting
that occupancy of their homes would be disturbed by traffic en-
gendered by the church, sound originating during services, and the
like.
The Board of Adjustment refused permission to build and action
was commenced to compel issuance of permits. The District Court
voided the ordinance as contrary to due process requirements, hold-
ing that vestiture of discretion in the Board, without standards, was
void, and ordered permits granted. The supreme court 64 unanimously
affirmed the lower court, the majority doing so on the basis that a
church might not upon constitutional principle be excluded from
any zone district, existing as a use by right in any district. Blanket
exclusion, the ccurt ruled, did not further the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare of the community. A zoning ordinance providing
62 Deuth v. City of Englewood, Dist. Ct. Arapohoe County, Civil Action No. 16736.
63 See note 64 infra at 375.
64 City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172 (1961).
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such exclusion was invalid under due process provisions both of
Article 2, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution, and the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In a specially concurring view, a minority of the court limited
concurrence to impropriety of delegation of discretion, substantially
without standards, and to the fact that abuse of discretion had
occurred.
The majority rule is consonant with that generally adopted in
the United States: "Churches and accessory uses are generally per-
mitted in districts zoned for residential use. In districts where
churches are permitted, a parish house, school, or convent used in
connection therewith is allowed as an accessory or appurtenant
thereto." 65 The author quotes Basset on Zoning, page 200, to like
effect:
Practically all zoning ordinances allow churches in all resi-
dence districts .... It would be unreasonable to force them
into business districts where there is noise and where land
values are high, or into dense residence districts (in cities
which have established several kinds of such districts.)
Some people claim that numerous churchgoers crowd the
street, that their automobiles line the curbs, and that music
and preaching disturb the neighbors. Communities that are
too sensitive to welcome churches should protect them-
selves by private restrictions.
Substantially all states, except California, which adopts a most
eccentric and unjustifiable rule,66 follow the quoted doctrine.
Clearly, the attempted exclusions have nothing to do with
public health, safety, and welfare in the zoning sense. Manifestly
churches, schools, and similar institutions are essentials of residen-
tial communities in a civilization like ours. Such functions, modal
to the life of the community, must occur where the community
lives. Worship and education cannot be excluded from a residence
district, no matter how sensitive.
The majority opinion in the Apostolic Christian Church case
reiterates strongly the basic precepts of the ownership right to
determine uses of property and emphasizes as well that zoning is
based wholly on public health, safety, and welfare and the restric-
65 Rathkopf, Zoning 259 (1956).
66 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of
Portersville, 90 Cal. App. 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949).
Expert a Commercial Printing
Brief Printers * Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books - Magazines
THE (a Books- Book BindingTHEe n House Organs
A PRESS 2400 CURTIS STREETDenver, Colorado
DICTA
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1962
tions necessary to the preservation thereof, but it is not based on
aesthetic considerations.
The tendency is to develop around Megalopolis a closed com-
munity, using municipal authority to buttress its own limited opin-
ions, and to exclude agencies of expression of opinion by others.
Zoning has no such purpose. There is no basis for such exclusion
of ideas upon the predicate of law. Communities so sensitive must
look not to zoning but to private covenant.
Several such isolationist communities have sought to exclude
not only churches, but even schools,67 an essay apparently well
outside the zoning powers, not only by reason of Apostolic Christian
Church, but also under the doctrine announced in Reber v. South
Lakewood Sanitation Dist.,"" where the court held that the Sanita-
tion District, in location of its facilities, was neither governed nor
governable by a county zoning resolution. That decision indicates
that governmental authority may not be amenable at all to zoning
regulations in the location and construction of public facilities, a
rule broadly adopted in many jurisdictions.
Balance appears manifest in these decisions. Pressure of resi-
dential groups may not overwhelm judicial judgment as to the
propriety of zoning restrictions. "Judicial judgment" must underlie
and be the predicate of all zoning. Here lies another paradox. Under
all applicable zoning statutes, before zoning may be instituted or,
after institution, before it may be varied or changed there must be
public hearings. Decisions such as the Holly Development case,69
earlier discussed, require a judicial standard of conduct by the leg-
islative body, making its decisions in zoning matters reviewable
by certiorari. From an early date the court has held that propriety
of zoning restrictions presented essentially judicial questions, to be
judicially reviewed. The courts, however, declare further that they
must refrain from "zoning," and that the legislative determination,
in areas definable as discretionary, must not be readily impeded.
Here a great weakness exists. Few who have observed zoning
hearings before legislative bodies or planning commissions can but
have noticed a fearful sameness in those hearings, a discussion either
perfunctory or essentially emotional, in an atmosphere pressed and
stressed and not conducive to the deriving of information from the
hearing process. Legislative bodies by their very nature are not
constructed to hear and determine cases. Hearings must be either
idle gestures, or since witnesses cannot properly testify or be exa-
mined, become a catch-as-catch-can debate, upon a predicate of emo-
tion-all useless as a determinant of land use problems.
The volume of such work makes its legislative handling imprac-
ticable. In Denver alone, 300-odd ordinances annually deal with
zoning or map changes, which necessitates the requisite amount of
time in council procedures.
The legislature thus usually attempts to exclude the peteitioner
from the council by a cumbersome process of administrative regula-
tion, as in Denver, coupled with an almost Elizabethan secrecy of
administrative procedure, or by a too .rapid processing of vital mat-
ters by council or commission, as in other parts of Megalopolis.
67 Town of Greenwood Village, Colorado, Ordinances.
68 362 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1961).
69 Supra note 45.
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Necessary development clearly requires special tribunals to
hear zoning questions, and an orderly procedure and genuine record,
reviewable and required to be reviewed by a court of law. Zoning.
should certainly not be handled in a manner less formal than public
utilities or those cases within cognizance of an Industrial Commis-
sion. Neither the bureaucratic approach nor the log-jammed legis-
lative one is basically workable.
Multiplicity of agencies often clouds administration of zoning
ma tters. By statute, zoning power is fundamentally vested in
legislative bodies, councils in the municipalities, and County Com-
missioners in the counties, with compulsory reference to planning
commissions for advisory opinions. Those planning commissions
exist at the local municipal level, at the county level, at interre-
gional levels, and, in certain aspects, at the state level. Each body
deems dear its prerogative of hearing and consultation, and these
often quadrupled procedures delay the whole process, to the eco-
nomic detriment of the community.
For the most part appointive and non-salaried, these bodies,
though often composed of persons devoted to performance of diffi-
cult duties, allow undesirable local politico-economic influences to
be exerted upon private matters of business and property manage-
ment. In their interactions and confluence, the multiple agencies
probably tend to confuse and impede, another paradox of zoning in
Megalopolis.
In conclusion, it may be posited that zoning is and will remain
with us as a possible method of protection of the public interest,
whatever that may be, in property use in the metropolitan area;
that the mechanism of zoning is one which has implicit within it
considerable utility as a limited protective device, and substantial
possibility and likelihood of abuse, both at the hands of the land
monopolist, and municipal bureaucrat, and the over-protective; that
the mechanism must always be subject to rigid control in the courts,
and that so controlled, it may perhaps serve as a braking mechanism
against too precipitate a change in land use. It is unlikely, however,
as a practical matter, that zoning legislation will ever primarily
determine land use, direct it, or form a fundamental basis for it.
The dynamics of a community, so long as that community remains
economically free, dictate the uses to which land will inevitably
gravitate, whatever expedient of zoning be employed.
Zoning otherwise employed than as a braking mechanism is
probably misapplied, and, historically, is probably futile. Zoning,
misapplied, as is obviously possible, and in this community actual,
can be deadly to the growth of the community, whose courts must
be ever vigilant against the dangers implicit in this mechanism.
Such abused zoning results in an atmosphere making possible
such dread distortions as the forced seizure of private lands im-
plicit in Urban Renewal, and the gravitation of basic economic
power into public- hands, totally unacceptable as deviant from the
basic postulates of our constitutional scheme.
Like most attempted regulations, introductions of rigidity into
a professedly free society, zoning and land controls in Megalopolis
are in their essence paradoxical.
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